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This paper presents a view of control system and safety system 
validation which is oriented towards problems of design and 
specification error. In particlar it treats the problem of de-
sign and specification errors in computer programs intended for 
safety systems. This is an area of pressing importance. Many 
kinds of computer based safety systems are already in use. Yet 
virtually all approaches to validation of software for nuclear 
and chemical plant safety systems, for transport and for medical 
systems, founder on the problem of specification errors. 
Proof of program consistency with formal specifications has been 
promulgated as a way of preventing software errors [1]. But the 
derivation of formal specifications needed for such proof has 
itself proved very error prone [2], Some 30-60% of software 
errors remaining in working control system software have been 
found to originate from specification errors [3]. 
There are several ways in which a design could be validated 
(fig. 1). a) The design as it is realised can be checked against 
the real world system to be controlled or against some kind of 
simulation model of the real world system, b) Specifications 
can be checked against a model of the real world system, c) The 
design can be checked against its specification, d) And if a 
model is to be used, it must be validated by comparison with a 
real world system. 
The role of the plant model in validation of safety systems is 
considered to be fundamental. Systems can be specified func-
tionally by describing their required input/output behaviour. 
But whether a system is acceptable depends on what it does in 
the plan' to be controlled. The ultimate te~c is what it 
achieves in the real system in the face of design errors, imple-
mentation errors and specification errors. The importance of 
validation against models of the plant rather than the real 
plart rests on three grounds. First, the designers mental model 
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Fig. 1. Types of validation. 
of the plant is a prime source of design information, and is 
available at an early stage in the design process. Second, the 
model is available to mathematical analysis, whereas the real 
plant is not. Third, thi plant model provides a way of vali-
dating safety before a control system is applied to a real plant. 
In validating safety and control systems, the plant model plays 
several roles. 
- It allows specifications to be stated at a high level, 
in terms of the plant rather than the control system. 
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- Incorrect performance of the complete system (control* 
safety+plant systems) can often be detected by inspection, 
whereas detection of errors in performance of the control 
system alone may be harder. 
- It allows test cases to be derived systematically, so 
that these can later be applied to the real system. 
- If the model is contructed by a person other than the 
control system designer, then this provides a very subtle 
form of redundancy, vulnerable to the absolute minimum of 
common causes of error. 
It is not considered here that there is a fixed sequence of 
specification, design, implementation, plant modelling, and 
validation. Rather, it is known that increase in knowledge of 
the plant to be controlled, and development of specifications, 
proceeds in parallel with software implementation in most cases. 
Hence there is a need for final validation of plant models and 
specifications immediately prior to use or real system tests of 
control or safety software. 
Testing or validation can proceed by considering specific cases 
of control system performance, and checking them against a 
specification, against a model, or against the real system. If 
this case by case approach is taken, then either some way is 
needed for selecting cases systematically, or a great many cases 
must be tested. Except for the simplest systems, this will gen-
erally require automatic testing if a reasonable level of re-
liability is to be demonstrated 14]. Alternatively, analytical 
forms of validation may be used [5]. As will be seen, these 
generally correspond to evaluation of sets of cases rather than 
individual cases of plant performance. 
- 8 -
The kinds of specifications described here will be of four 
types. 
1. Functional specifications - descriptions of what a 
system should do. 
2. Safety specifications - descriptions of what a 
system should not do. 
3. Performance specifications - descriptions of how well 
a system should perform, 
in terms of a performance 
criterion. 
4. Reliability or risk 
specifications 
- statements of the maximum 
probability with which 
specified unwanted events 
may occur. 
(Other specification types are possible). 
Functional specifications are particularly important for the 
methods described here. The language for these is fundamental 
to functional validation. 
Essentially a functional specification states what a system 
should do. It can be expressed by statements such as: 
- When A happens, X, Y, Z should happen. 
- When A happens, if P is true, X, Y, Z should happen. 
- When A happens, X then Y then Z should happen. 
- A should never happen. 
- A should never happen while Y is true. 
- P should always be true. 
- Q should never be true. 
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In these statement types, the terms A, X. Y, X happens may be 
events or actions describing specific changes of state, for 
example 'button 12 is pushed*, or 'pressure becomes high', or 
'tank 1 becomes filled*. Events described in this simple way 
imply a finite state model of the plant. Terms like P in these 
statements may be conditions such as 'pressure is high*. 
As an alternative to these simple finite state descriptions of 
events and conditions, more flexible description forms may be 
used, for example: 
- Continuous state discrete time models - here state 
variable values are givtn by real numbers, but changes 
are described as happening at specific points in time, 
e.g. 'when pressure becomes greater than 10 MPa, relief 
valve opens *. 
- Continuous state and continuous time, behavioural, e.g. 
when A happens pressure follows trajectory T, 
- Continuous state, continuous time, analytically de-
scribed, e.g. 'when button 12 is pressed pressure should 
= kt2'. 
As can be seen from the examples, there is no particular prob-
lem in combining these specification types. There may though, 
be considerable difficulties in drawing analytical conclusions 
concerning more complex specification types. Note that similar 
statement types can be used to describe aspects of plant models 
and control systems, if the word 'should* is removed. For 
example, 'when pressure difference across valve is AP, flow 
through valve is K/AP'. A syntax for such a model description 
language is given in appendix 1. 
The language described so far does not allow timing statements 
to be made. Terms like'After <time delay>, For <time interval>, 
before <event>, after <event>, until <event> may be added to 
complete this aspect of the specifications. 
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Performance specifications generally take the fom of statements 
about the rate at which events should take place, or of math-
iaatical functions of state variables which are to be maximised, 
or are to exceed certain values* e.g. production rate > 1 ton 
per hour. 
Whether the language proposed here is adequate for all purposes 
is not known. What is known is that it is adequate for very 
•any practical applications. 
Framework off testing a design against a specification and a 
model 
The rost straightforward way of checking a design against its 
specifications is by simulation. Inputs are provided to a sim-
ulator of the control system and the plant, or to the real con-
trol system &nd a simulator of the plant. The performance of 
the control system is monitored, to ensure performance is satis-
factory. 
Checking can be performed in an ad hoc fashion, just to see 
whether performance is acceptable to the designer. If very much 
simulation is to be performed though, it is practical to 
'instrument' the simulation, that is, to convert the logical 
statements of safety and functional specifications to equivalent 
monitoring devices, and to apply these to the simulation (fig. 
2). For example, a safety specification for a railway system is 
that two trains should never occupy one block section at one 
time. A detector for this condition is simple to implement and 
can 'ring a bell' if the safety criterion is breached in a sim-
ulation. 
For complete validation of a system using simulation, it is 
necessary to provide all possible sequences of inputs under all 
possible initial starting states. This is theoretically feas-
ible when finite state models are used in the simulation. It 
is not theoretically possible when continuous variable systems 
are used. In both cases there are very large problems in pro-
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SIMPLE RANDOM SIMULATION 
A Random data selection 
B Simulation result 
C Simulation result 
D Random data selection 
SYMBOLIC SIMULATION 
'systematic input selection 
results of symbolic execution 
results of consequence analysis 
'systematic' input selection 
Pig. _2_. General scheme for control system testing against a 
plant model 
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viding even an approximation to a complete simulation for prac-
tical systems. The number of inputs required is generally 
astronomical [ 4 ] . 
If a simulation approach is to be taken to control system vali-
dation it is necessary to be able to test whole classes of in-
puts at one time. The tests must be chosen so that by applying 
a single test, possibilities of errors or unacceptable perform-
ance for the entire class can be detected. 
One way of doing this is suggested by the technique of 'symbolic 
execution' of computer programs [153. Instead of working with 
real values for variables, the simulator should work with values 
described by symbolic formulae. The 'symbolic simulation' 
starts with a symbolic description of possible initial states 
of the plant, and investigates possible discrete changes of 
plant output/computer inputs. Applying the inputs to computer 
programs, it uses 'symbolic execution' to deduce computer out-
puts. Applying the outputs from the programs to the plant model 
it deduces the output from plant components resulting from ap-
plication of symbolically described inputs. 
To allow this symbolic simulation, the process of deducing out-
puts from inputs for plant components needs to be formalised. A 
state model of plant components allows this. Components models 
take the form of a set of transfer functions. 
{input event + component state -*• output event + new component 
state} 
Deductions in symbolic execution take the form 
input event + component model + component state 
* output event + new component state. 
This process hat been formalised by the author as automated con-
sequence analysis [6, 7, 8]. So far, only finite state versions 
of this analysis have been implemented. 
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Deducing an output event involves matching an input event to a 
transfer function, and extracting the output event from the 
transfer function. Matching a given formula describing an in-
put event to one of a set of event transfer functions involves 
being able to match formulae to see whether they are identical, 
or whether one implies the other. If the given input event plus 
the given component formulae are identical to, or imply, the 
prefix of an event transfer function, the output event and new 
component state condition are deduced. 
The simplest way of ensuring ease of matching between input 
events, component conditions and transfer functions, is to re-
duce all event formulae to a canonical form and to keep them in 
this form. The form which the author has found most useful is 
disjunctive normal form in which terms are grouped in sets 
ANDed together, and the ANDed groups are ORed together. The 
terms are sets of equalities or inequalities between state vari-
ables and finite state values. 
The ability to derive canonical forms sets an effective limit to 
the freedom of language which can be used in specifications and 
model descriptions of this kind. 
Canonical forms are also important in deriving a complete set of in-
puts for this kind of evaluation of system behaviour. The full range 
of values which the system input can take is described logically, 
and the description is reduced to a disjunctive normal form. Each of 
the OR'ed disjuncts can then be regarded as a 'test case' for sym-
bolic simulation. As the simulation proceeds, it will be found 
that the further course of the simulation depends on plant state. 
As each alternative state (disjunct of the conditions describing 
the plant) is reached, a new sub case of the test is derived. 
Monitoring of symbolic simulation for satisfaction of satefy 
specifications involves using the same kind of deduction tech-
neques as for deducing plant component output from inputs. Such 
monitoring involves the difficulty that some deductions may be 
made to the effect that specifications may or may not be satis-
fied, without being able to say either way. For example, it 
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may be deduced that plant pressure becomes greater than 10 atm. 
A safety specification may be that it never becomes greater 
than 20 atm. It is not possible to decide whether the specifi-
cation is satisfied without improving the model. 
An alternative to symbolic simulation which works forwards in 
time, is to work backwards, making deductions from effect to 
cause. A statement concerning system state is chosen at some 
place in the system, and deductions are made backwards through 
the system. The deductions are made continuously until only 
external inputs to the system and initial states remain in the 
deductions. The final statement then represents the cause of 
the initial statement. By keeping different disjuncts separate, 
each disjunct represents a different class of inputs, a 
different input case. If the language given in appendix 1 is 
used, then each class is described by a set of equalities and 
inequalities. 
This method has been implemented by the author and his col-
leagues using finite state models for process plant, as auto-
matic fault tree construction [8, 9] and using weakest pre-
condition theory for making deductions about software [10, 11]. 
If a neutral initial statement is made the starting point of 
this process, then the method serves to find the different 
classes of input resulting in fundamentally different modes of 
system behaviour. Each class is described by a set of poly-
nomial inequalities. By solving the inequalities individual 
test valves can be chosen which guarantee a coverage of each 
fundamentally different type of behaviour of the plant model. 
By choosing many test points in each class, the probability 
that the system behaviour is described by an incorrect polyno-
mial can be reduced to a very low value [12]. 
Alternatively, if the starting point for the backward deduction 
is made to be a (negated) safety specification or a functional 
specification statement, the conditions under which these 
specifications are not fulfilled can be found. 
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If timing is an important aspect of performance then symbolic 
simulations and backward deductions of causes must take into 
account the time at which various events occur, and the time at 
which various conditions are true. This corresponds tc setting 
up a set of 'histories' of plant state descriptions. 
Checking specifications 
The methods described in the previous section allow some aspects 
of specifications to be checked formally. Firstly, the self 
consistency of specifications can be checked, by reducing the 
overall set of specifications to canonical form. 
Specifications canonical I False 




reduced spec, in 
canonical form 
Secondly, the specifications can be checked against the model 













error in model 






cation to be met. 
Thirdly, the specifications can be checked with both plant 
model and control system as in the previous action, to yield 
cases where the specification is not met. 
Specification 
+ plant model 
+ control system [ False 
TRUE 
OTHERWISE 
error in model or 
plant failure 
analysis 







Some completeness criteria can also be established for specifi-
cations, for example that all outputs of a system should have 
their range of values specified. Unfortunately, it is not poss-
ible to provide general rules to guarantee completeness of sets 
of specifications, because this is a creative task. What can 
be done is to ensure 'closure' of the specification set, that 
is, that any particular specification type is applied uniformly. 
For example, if a state variable is specified for some point in 
time it should perhaps be specified at all times. 
There are some general safety principles which can be applied 
at all times to any system, for example fail safe principles, 
and the principle that it should always be possible to bring a 
system back to its rest state. Making a collection of these 
principles would greatly strengthen the theory presented here. 
Adequacy of models 
If plant models are to play such an important role in vali-
dation of systems designs, then it is necessary to know how 
these will be developed and verified. 
A fundamental principle should be that the model should be de-
veloped using a well developed theory of modelling, according 
to a standard procedure. If this is done, then the resulting 
models can be justified by reference to the general success of 
the standard procedure. Typical standard modelling procedures 
have been described elsewhere [13]. 
There will, even with the best modelling procedure, be many 
choices left open to the engineer. In particular the degree of 
detail in models must be chosen. An acceptable degree of de-
tail should preferably be chosen by reference to earlier systems 
and accident reports. A general rule is that the plant model 
should be implemented at a level of detail sufficient to re-
predict system perfo: ance and accident types which have al-
ready happened. 
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Once the plant is built, the model needs to be validated before 
a full set of system tests begins, or before system validation 
is terminated. For these, system identification methods, or 
parameter adjustment optimisation methods are generally necess-
ary [14] . The procedures are well known from development 
of analogue and hybrid computer plant models. 
Remaining problems 
The theory described here provides several routes to validation 
of control and safety system designs against a plant model and 
a set of system specifications. The result should be an internal 
validation of a system which is much more thorough than those in 
general use today. It is worthwhile enquiring, though, about 
the remaining possibilities for error. 
One possibility is that models are implemented wrongly, or they 
are conceived incorrectly. There is always a possibility that 
the designer misunderstands the way in which his plant works. 
If the model is made independently of the control system then 
there is a good chance that errors will be detected. But there 
remains the possibility that the control system designer and the 
model constructor have similar misconceptions about the plant. 
Another possibility for error is that the model is not made suf-
ficiently detailed in all its aspects so that some parts of the 
specification are not checked. This is particularly important 
if some parts of the specification are implicit. Again it is 
important to be able to build up a library of different types 
of formal specifications so that this problem gradually can be 
covered by reference to standard cases. 
One particular form of error in models and specifications is 
that of omitted special cases. For example, in specifying a 
tax system, it may be overlooked that the regent is generally 
treated as a special case. This type of error is not likely to 
be trapped by the techniques described here. But by allowing a 
very high level of language for specification it may be hoped 
that this kind of error may be more easily avoided. 
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APPENDIX. A LANGUAGE FOR PROCESS PLANT SPECIFICATIONS 
Syntax for functional specification language. 
<conjunct> ::= <variable> <condition operator> 
<variable value> 
<condition 
operator> ::= = | > | < | IS 
<condition> ::= <disjunct> <OR <disjunct>>" 
<disjunct> ::= <conjunct> <AND <conjunct>>" 
<simple event> : := <variable> <event operator> <variable value> 
<event operator> :: = BECOMES | 
BECOMES EQUAL TO 
BECOMES GREATER THAN 
BECOMES LESS THAN 
Note: The language becomes much more powerful if <variable value> 
is replaced by <arithmetic expression> 
<event> ::• <simple event> <AND <simple event>>" 
<event 
specification> ::» WHENEVER <event> IF <condition> 
THEN <event sequence> 
<event sequence> ::« <delayed event><THEN <delayed event>>" 
<delayed event> ::• <AFTER <arithmetic expressions* <event>>| 
<event> 
<condition 
specification> ::« WHILEVER <condition> 
THEN <condition> | 
<condition> ALWAYS 
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<simple action> <subject><verb> 
<subject><verb><object> 
<subject><verb><<preposition><substantive>> n 
<subject> := <substantive> 
<object> ..= <substantive> 
<substantive> ::= name of concept defined in the model. 
<action 
specification> :: = 
<WHEN <event»1 <IP <condition>>1 
o o 
THEN <action sequence> 
<action 
sequence> \- <delayed action> <THEN <delayed action>> n 
<delayed 
action> := <AFTER orithmetic expression^ 
<extended action> 
<extended 
action> := <action> <extent> 
<extent> FOR <arithmetic expression> 
UNTIL <event> 
<verb> ::= OPENS, CLOSES, STARTS, FILLS, MOVES, — 
<preposition> FROM, TO, 
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Note: While the semantics of event and condition operators 
can be standardised, semantic interpretation of verbs 
and prepositions must be supplied. 
For simple verbs such semantic descriptions can generally 
be given in terms of events, conditions and processes. 
A process is a continuous change taking place over a 
period of time (a time which is long compared with time 
delays for 'events'. 
Processes can be described in terms of a single verb, 
CHANGES. 
<simple action> ::= <variable> CHANGES FROM <value> 
TO <value> | 
<variable> CHANGES AT RATE 
(arithmetic expression) 
For systems with internal structure, statements to describe this 
structure may be useful 
decomposition 
specification> ::• <subsystem name> CONTAINS 
<part list> 
<part list> s:» <subsystem name> <, <part list>>'~ 
<connection 
specification> ::• <subsystem name> IS CONNECTED TO 
<subsystem name> FROM <part name> 
TO <part name> 
<variable> ::• <variable name> OF <object name> | 
<object name> <variable name> | 
<object name> <part name> <variable name> 
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<subsystem specifi.cat.ion>::* 
<subsystem name> HAS PORTS 
<port name> <, <port nane>>n 
<subsystem nane> HAS VARIABLES 
<variable name> <, <variable n a w » n 
o 
<port specification> ::= 
<port name> HAS VARIABLES 
<variable naxe> <, <variable name>>" 
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